While immigration is transforming most western democracies, scholarship documenting these changes cannot help but reflect the differing historical conditions that have shaped the destination countries where migrants settle.
While the gap in scholarship on immigrant integration is converging between traditional countries of immigration such as the U.S., Canada and Australia and countries which have slowly come to terms with themselves as immigrant destinations-Western Europe and increasingly Southern Europe, there are still differences in empirical data available, theoretical models to guide research, and traditions within stratification research that influence the scholarship that is produced (Alba and Waters 2011) . In this paper I describe how British and U.S.
researchers have classified immigrant populations in their studies. I underscore the importance of generation in American immigration research and suggest that studies built on the importance of generation can illuminate social processes in Britain. I argue that immigrant integration can be obscured without careful attention to the measurement and theoretical specification of where and how generation matters to understanding immigrant integration. I then discuss some of the complexities of defining and measuring immigrant generation and I describe new developments in the measurement of generation that take into account age at migration, and historical period and cohort effects. These more refined definitions of immigrant generation would be a beneficial tool for both British and American researchers attempting to measure how well immigrants and their descendants are doing over time.
Historical Patterns of Immigration to the U.S. and the U.K.

Comparative studies of immigrant integration in Europe and North
America have stressed the ways in which the U.S. and the U.K. are more similar to one another than to other Western European countries on a number of dimensions important to understanding the pattern of immigrant integration. While Britain also has an undocumented population it is much smaller, both relatively and absolutely.
While the U.S. has been a magnet for immigrants from many different countries, Britain drew most of its immigrants in the latter half of the 20 th Century from former colonies. This colonial legacy was quite important in shaping expectations among immigrants of full inclusion in the society and in shaping the immigration laws and bureaucratic directives that allowed people into the country.
It has also been important in shaping the statistical system that classifies the population leading to a system based more on measuring race and ethnicity rather than immigrant generation. In recent years Britain has begun receiving immigrants from Eastern Europe, especially Poland, and asylum seekers who may not come from former colonies, perhaps leading to different kinds of accommodation among immigrants in the future (Vertovec, 2007) .
Measurement of Race in the U.S. and U.K.
It is the attention to race and the definition of groups as ethnic and racial minorities in both the U.S. and Britain that most differentiates them from other Western European countries coping with integration of immigrants and their descendants. The United States has classified post 1965 immigrants in racial terms, based on a system of classification and social identification that arose out of internal population dynamics owing to a long history of slavery and to the conquest of American Indians and Hispanics in the Southwest and Puerto Rico (Waters, 2008) . When Asians started to arrive as immigrants in the late 19 th Century they were racially classified by the federal government and their racial exclusion was ultimately enshrined in American immigration law until the 1950s.
In an ironic turn of events the classification of the population by race that had been developed in order to discriminate and exclude, was officially enshrined in our federal statistical system after the Civil Rights Movement resulted in legislation designed to prevent and prosecute discrimination, and is now most vigorously defended by racial minorities themselves.
The development of anti-discrimination legislation was also incorporated into British society. Modeled after the U.S. race and civil rights establishment, Britain has developed a policy based on multiculturalism and anti-racism to integrate immigrants and their descendants. Thus while Britain and the U.S.
often perceive their "immigration" integration issues as race relations issues, this is very different from other Western European countries. France explicitly forbids collecting data on race and nationality and in Germany the sharp divisions that surround immigration are understood to be about birthplace, citizenship and ethnic belonging, rather than skin color. Yet this common language of race as an organizing principle of difference in Britain and the U.S. can obscure some real differences in what the two countries mean by "race" and in the social construction of ethnicity and in the drawing of group boundaries.
One possible difference between the U.S. and the U.K. has to do with the "color line" in both societies. In the U.S. there is a vigorous debate occurring about the key dividing line in American society. (Gans 1999; Foner and Fredrickson 2004; Lee and Bean 2010 Latinos has meant that the serious ramifications of race for life chances in the US are concentrated among those socially identified as blacks, not those identified as non-whites. (Waters, 2008 , Lee and Bean 2010 , Kasinitz, 2004 .
In the U.K., the key distinction might be more clearly drawn between white British and other non-whites. Patterns of acceptance and social identification continue to posit a common "minority" experience, encapsulated in the term BME or blacks and minority ethnics. In addition blacks are not uniformly more separate from whites than Asians are in Britain. Indeed on certain key indicators including intermarriage and residential integration black Caribbeans and black
Africans are more integrated with whites than are Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (Peach 2005) . This is very surprising to Americans who learn about it, since newly arrived immigrants from all over the globe quickly integrate with whites on these measures at higher levels than African Americans, despite their presence for hundreds of years, and their cultural similarities with native whites. were once a highly stigmatized group. Whether these low skilled European and white immigrants will come to be seen as a "problem" or as a "minority" remains to be seen.
Models of Integration and Assimilation
Comparative studies of immigration and ethnicity in the U.S. and Europe have become more numerous in recent years but the field is still in its very early stages. Two issues plague comparative research-different theoretical and analytical frameworks and a lack of comparable data and statistical definitions. Morawska (2008; 2009) iii (Heath and McMahon, 1996: 91) The important series of studies sponsored by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) (Daniel 1968 , Smith 1977 , Brown 1984 and Modood, Berthoud et al. 1997 ) only rarely mention generational differences-though the fourth PSI study does briefly look at generational differences.
Mostly though British quantitative research has focused on ethnic minorities, self identified using the categories developed for the census, without attention to generational change (Favell 2003) . This developed out of the "conceptual history that has always looked for its normative inspiration to American race relations of the 1960s and has always defined Britain more narrowly as a country of post colonial immigration only."
Data Availability: Census Categories in Both Countries
The theories of immigrant assimilation developed in the U.S. during the twentieth century highlighted generational change as the yardstick to measure changes in immigrant groups. The first generation (the foreign-born) were less assimilated and less exposed to American life than were their American-born children (the second generation), and their grandchildren (the third generation)
were in turn more like the core American mainstream than their parents.
Empirically this generational progress was found for European origin groups for language, education, income, and residential assimilation and for patterns of intermarriage (Lieberson and Waters 1988; Alba, 1990 ).
Much of this research was possible because the American census which had always asked people where they were born also asked a birthplace of parents question from 1870 until 1970, and this information allowed researchers to track changes between the first and the second generation. These were the data by which legions of scholars documented changes in residence, language use, intermarriage, occupation and income from the immigrant generation to their native born children (Lieberson 1980) . By 1980, the number of first and second generation European immigrants had dwindled and there was an interest in third and later generation ethnic groups. The birthplace of parents question was replaced with an ancestry question in 1980 so the ability to identify the second generation in census data was lost. Since the legacy of studying immigrant integration by generation was well established by the time post 1965 immigrants began to come of age scholars mounted studies to collect original data on the second generation to make up for the lack of census data (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Kasinitz et. al. 2008; Bean et.al. 2010 ). In addition, the recognition that a new second generation was coming of age prompted the Current Population 
The Concept of Generation and its Measurement
The experience of European immigrants in the U.S. in the twentieth (Alba 1990 , Waters 1990 ).
For European immigrants to the U.S. the "generation" served as a temporal gauge of immigrant group assimilation, where "generation" is the ancestral distance from the point of arrival in a society (Alba 1988, p. 213 In a landmark study of generational change among Mexican Americans, Telles and Ortiz (2008) recognize that generation for a group like Mexicans with a long continous history of immigration can be measured in a number of ways.
They distinguish between generation-since-immigration, and family generation.
Because they have a longitudinal study which began in the 1960s with different generations of Mexican Americans, they can look at change over generations since immigration, as well as changes within families-from grandparents to parents to children. In some cases the original grandparents in the 1960s study were themselves second generation. Thus they show family generational progress over time-from grandfather to father to son, as well as documenting stalled progress for Mexican American third generation respondents who do not show convergence with native whites.
In a reanalysis of these data Alba, Jimenez and Marrow (2013) argue that it is important to think about the different historical periods that current Mexican second generation people lived through. The current Mexican second generation includes older people who grew up in a segregated society in the 1920s and 30s
where de jure discrimination against Mexicans was practiced, and young people who came of age in a post industrial, affirmative action era where de jure but certainly not de facto discrimination had ended. They argue that intermarriage and mixed ancestry characterize later generations of Mexican Americans, and if those more assimilated later generation respondents are not captured in surveys, the relative success of the group might be underestimated. This is because there is a link between higher educational attainment, mixed ancestry.
intermarriage and geographic mobility" (Alba, Jimenez and Marrow 2013:19) . Duncan and Trejo (2011) and Alba and Islam (2009) ancestry in an open-ended question. The "stickiness" of Irish identity is quite evident as Irish is a wildly popular identity (Waters 1990; Alba 1990 ). Hout and Goldstein (1994) analyzed these data and found many more people identifying In Britain where the Afro Caribbean population has high levels of partnering (if not always formal marriage) with whites this process might also be progressing. In later generations with more intermixing, when does an individual no longer identify as "mixed" on the census and is that related to socioeconomic characteristics? Would a generational approach to all of the ethnic and minority groups in Britain show some of this "ethnic leakage" into the mainstream white population? A recent study by Muttarak and Heath (2010) find that intermarriage increases in the second generation for all groups in Britain, even those who are known to be more endogamous than other groups (Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.) They also find that for some groups such as the Indians, the higher the education the more likely the individual will outmarry. This implies that over a few generations there could be significant ethnic demographic loss of identity such as that observed among Mexicans in the US.
Another important strand of research in the U.S. has examined the intersection of lifecourse and age at migration with generational measures for the first generation. The research on the second generation in recent decades has not followed a consistent pattern in identifying the children of immigrants. Many studies such as the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study and the New York Second Generation Study have included in the "second generation", children born abroad of immigrant parents who immigrated in childhood (Kasinitz et.al. 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) . Because of the limitations of census data described above, Perlmann (2005) for instance uses arrival at very young ages as a proxy for the second generation in his study of Mexican Americans.
Rumbaut ( for Asians. Both analyses show that using years since immigration or a continuous measure for "exposure" to the host society was most accurate. They both did not find much support for the threefold categorization proposed by Rumbaut (2004) . For Latinos, Myers and colleagues suggest splitting the population into people who arrived before age 6, between 6 and 9, between 10 and 12, and between 13 and 17. Lee and Edmonston (2011) recommend a split at 5, 9 and 12. Both analyses find strong effects on host country language attainment and educational attainment for age at arrival. For Latinos, "immigrants who arrive prior to the age of six are six times as likely to complete high school and nearly 14 times as likely to speak English very well in adulthood compared to Mexican immigrants who arrive as teens." (Myers, Gao and Ameka 2009:225) . Age at arrival is similarly important in affecting language and educational attainment among Asians. Lee and Edmonston caution that since immigrant groups differ in age at arrival, these compositional effects are driving some of the differences in these outcome variables across groups. (Lee and Edmonston 2011:557).
Heath and Kilpi-Jakonen (forthcoming) have examined the effects of age at arrival on educational outcomes in OECD countries using PISA data. They find that there is a "late arrival penalty" for educational achievement where late arriving children do worse than early arriving children. But they also find that there is no cutoff age that best captures this effect. Instead of a categorical approach they suggest that the log of the years in the destination country works best in predicting host country language attainment. This echoes the work of Third, since children develop rapidly, and in country schooling and the ability to learn the host country language without an accent differs by age at arrival, the experience of the children of immigrants is likely to differ by this important variable. The fractional generation categories of 1.25, or 1.5 or 1.75
can be employed if that is all that is available, but a continuous measure of age at arrival is even better at capturing this effect. Recent work suggests that care
should be used in choosing these cutoff points, and that they be related to the dimension of assimilation that will be measured. University.
